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101-00713/

Peacebuilding during Peace Support Operations: A Survey and Analysis of Recent Missions

January 10, 1998

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INTRODUCTION

It is commonplace now to observe that in the late 20th century war is more often than not being waged against civilians. How appropriate, then, that civilians are beginning to play a predominant role in United Nations' peace support operations (PSOs) intended to bring an end to war and a beginning of peace.

Clearly, civilians have a large stake in the outcome of such undertakings. But civilian participation in peace support operations is more than a reflection of their interest. It is the result, instead, of three closely related developments: the end of the Cold War, the prominence of intra-state conflict, and the resort to peacebuilding as a method for addressing these post-cold war conflicts.

PSOs have responded to these developments by becoming a multi-disciplinary art to a far greater degree than they were in the first 45 years of United Nations (UN) peace missions. As such, they represent the international community's struggle to come to grips with conflict and its resolution on the doorstep of the new millennium. Front and centre in that struggle is the effort to promote peacebuilding. Indeed, PSOs are often the entry point for a longer term UN bid to build peace in recently war-torn societies.

In this study, I will examine how civilian peacebuilding is being integrated into UN mandated PSOs. While the focus will be on some of the more recent or ongoing missions -- MINURCA in the Central African Republic, UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, MINURSO in Western Sahara, and UNOMIL in Liberia -- reference will also be made to some earlier missions.

The purpose of the study is to identify some of the issues that Canada and the United Nations will likely be grappling with as they engage in new and future PSOs. What types of PSOs can we expect? Does Canada have the appropriate tools to contribute to them? What progress is being made toward better coordination among UN departments and agencies and how can it be improved, if at all? What gaps in policy and doctrine exist? These are some of the

questions that will be implicitly asked and hopefully answered by the study.

The rest of the paper is divided into four sections. First, a short section on background and definitions will establish the parameters of discussion and provide the context for the study. Next, is a section devoted to the examination of the mandates of recent operations to determine how peacebuilding is faring in these missions and what trends can be identified for the future. The third section will build on the first two, reflecting on the progress that has been made, identifying the challenges that remain, and proposing some tentative recommendations for Canada, both in terms of what it can do at home and at the United Nations. The final section will draw some general conclusions.

An advisory about limitations. This paper is certainly not the first word on the subject of UN PSOs, nor is it intended to be the last. A far more detailed, thorough-going and intensive study would be required to do the subject complete justice. Time-limitations prevent that. Hopefully, though, this paper will give policymakers and interested observers pause to reflect about the nature of current PSOs and how Canada and the United Nations can best contribute to such complex undertakings, and perhaps move them to consider at least some of the recommendations made in the study.

I. FROM PEACEKEEPING TO PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Background

The final death rattle of the Cold War and the consequent rise of intra-state conflict spurred a resurgent interest in both the United Nations and in different forms of peacekeeping. More specifically, it created enthusiasm for different forms of UN military operations to stem the rising tide of internal armed conflict in which genocide -- or ethnic cleansing -- and the targeting of civilians is rapidly becoming a repellent norm.[1] Traditional peacekeeping -- interpositionary military forces monitoring a cease-fire -- would not be enough it was argued.

New terms were invented and some old concepts revived: Multi-disciplinary peacekeeping, composite missions, humanitarian intervention, peace enforcement and peacebuilding. The international community became giddy with the possibilities. They were further emboldened by Security Council resolution 688 authorizing UN intervention to protect the Kurds in Northern Iraq from Iraqi military forces following the Gulf War. UNICEF Executive Director James Grant characterized the resolution as an "abrupt break with the past" and a "precedent" in the cause of humanitarian intervention when state sovereignty is invoked to violate human rights.[2] Respected scholars, too, leapt on the bandwagon. Witness, for example, the concluding remarks of Tom Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell in their 1991 essay on military humanitarianism:

> With the humanitarian intervention in Iraq, the international community may be perched on the brink of a new era in which states will codify the principles and identify the appropriate conditions when humanitarian imperatives will override domestic

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John MacKinlay has been one of the most active and cogent thinkers about the different types of UN military responses that will be required of peacekeepers in the post cold war. He refers to these different operations as first, second, and third generation peacekeeping. See John MacKinlay...

Address by Mr. James P. Grant, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund to the Humanitarian Ceasefires: Peacebuilding For Children Conference." Ottawa: Centre for Days of Peace. *Humanitarian Ceasefires: Peacebuilding for Children. Report of a Conference*, Ottawa, 24-27 November 1991, pp.122-123.

jurisdiction. Military humanitarianism provides a bridge between Cold War military capabilities and the vision of new world order proponents.[3]

It was in this heady atmosphere that UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali published his *Agenda for Peace*, which in its prescription for a comprehensive approach to peace called not only for peacekeeping but for peace enforcement.. Old and respected UN hands like Sir Brian Urquhart -- also known as Mr. Peacekeeping -- called for the establishment of voluntary UN military brigades to undertake enforcement activity especially in cases of gross transgressions of human rights.[4] But very quickly, this sense of optimism that the UN could enforce peace and would intercede to prevent humanitarian disasters was dashed on the shores of conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. The new world order was tested -- along with many of the new assumptions about forceful peacekeeping -- and found wanting.

Out of this crucible of failure one thing became abundantly clear: Peace cannot be imposed on warring societies but must be a shared desire sincerely committed to by combatants if the effort is to stand a reasonable chance of success.[5] It also became clear that internecine and internal armed conflicts would be a primary feature of the international landscape unless and until the root causes underlying them were addressed. While enthusiasm for peace enforcement-type activities began to recede, peacebuilding rose to the fore as method for addressing deep-rooted conflict.

Defining Peacebuilding

Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism." *Survival*,. Vol. 33 No. 5 (Sept./Oct. 1991), p. 463-464.

Brian Urquhart, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force." *The New York Review of Books*, 10 June 1993.

See, for instance: Thomas Franck, "A Holistic Approach to Building Peace." in Olara Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century*, New York: Rowan and Littlefield Publishers Inc. (1998), p. 278.

In the Canadian government's definition, peacebuilding is the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace in formerly war-torn societies, and decrease the likelihood of renewed violent conflict. The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to enhance the indigenous capacity of a society to manage conflict without violence. Ultimately, then, peacebuilding aims at building human security, a concept that includes democratic governance, human rights, the rule of law, sustainable development, and equitable access to resources.

While a more precise definition of peacebuilding remains elusive, there is considerable agreement about what it should entail on the ground.[6] Peacebuilding can involve a wide array of initiatives and activities aimed at reducing tensions and strengthening mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution in countries prone to large scale violence. These peacebuilding activities are intended to create a more stable atmosphere in which the root causes of conflict can be addressed. The list of activities which can considered as peacebuilding is practically endless depending on the local context, but included in most standard lists are many of the functions of modern peacekeeping operations, including:

- election monitoring\supervision\organization
- de-mining
- disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
- resettlement and/or repatriation of refugees and internally displaced
- economic assistance\reconstruction
- legislative and judicial support\training\reform
- police and military training
- human rights monitoring\investigation\education
- institution-building
- rehabilitation
- conflict resolution, mediation, and third party problem-solving
- trust\confidence building

See Annex I for a brief overview of some of the more recent definitions that have been offered.

- strengthening civil society
- psychological support

The list could go on. Nearly as striking is the number of different agencies and organizations that can claim a share of the peacebuilding pie: government departments and agencies; national and international relief and development actors; non-governmental organizations; private sector companies; international financial institutions; and regional organizations. Each of them are eager to exploit the nexus between development and security commonly known as peacebuilding.

The inclusion of many of these activities, along with different civilian organizations, in the planning and undertaking of modern peacekeeping has led to the use of the broader term "peace support operations" to describe today's complex missions. It is a term that is intended to embrace the wider and more engaged nature of the activity in the field. While not used by the United Nations itself - which maintains a Department of Peacekeeping Operations - "peace support operations" or "PSOs" is the term now used by the Canadian government to describe the complex missions to which Canada is called to contribute.

A glance at the mandates of many recent PSOs demonstrates how ingrained certain of these peacebuilding activities have become to many operations. As we shall see below de-mining and disarmament/demobilization/reintegration is prominent in nearly every operation (especially in Africa), as is election (or referendum) monitoring, supervision and even organization. Human rights investigation and reporting is also a prominent activity, along with security sector reform often with the use of civilian police in both training and institution-building. Infrastructure rebuilding, of such things as roads, bridges or telephone lines is not unusual. When some activities are not an explicit part of the PSO mandate, the operation often works closely with other peacebuilding actors that have a responsibility for such activities, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The UN Development Program (UNDP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and international financial institutions (IFIs).

II. RECENT OPERATIONS AND MANDATES

The report of the International Peace Academy's most recent annual Vienna Seminar, held in July 1998, contained the following bold statement:

> [P]erhaps the greatest challenge of peacekeeping operations today is coming to terms with the fact that classic peacekeeping mandates are, for the most part, a thing of the past. Besides lingering examples such as the UN Peace-keeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) - which many would argue has frozen the situation in Cyprus - and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), first-generation peacekeeping is barely conceivable as a policy option today.[7]

The report went on to note that not only have non-military aspects of operations assumed a larger role in recent years, but the composition of missions has added layers of complexity to an already tangled web of relationships.

Before turning to examine the peacebuilding aspects of some of the more recent PSOs, we would be well advised to contemplate the full import of these statements. In sum, what they tell us is, first, that the PSOs we are seeing today are a relatively new phenomena for the United Nations, for member countries, and for those actors employed in the field. While, as the above statement notes, traditional operations can barely be conceived of as a policy option today, clearly the break with tradition and coming to terms with new realities in an organization as hidebound (no offence intended) and politicized as the United Nations is a test for that organization.

Michéle Griffin (Rapporteur), "IPA Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping." Vienna, 20-30 July 1998, New York: International Peace Academy, *IPA Training Seminar Report*, p. 5.

In this regard, we also need to remember that the UN has been faced with a series of quite different and dangerous challenges in the last ten years, challenges for which, for the most part, it has never been equipped nor prepared, either constitutionally or in terms of human and financial resources. While it has met some of them, it has failed abysmally at others. Nevertheless, it tends to be judged by its performance as a whole and each new operation contemplated, regardless of what type it is, bears the stigma of all past failures. If the organization can be criticized for moving too slowly to adopt new methods, procedures, and mechanisms to meet today's realities, it might also be excused somewhat for practicing due diligence in a complicated international environment.

The second thing to take from the IPA statement is that the new PSOs are highly complex undertakings involving a bewildering array of actors from a variety of backgrounds with different levels of experience, not to mention motivations, engaging in what is intrinsically and intricately a deeply politicized and resource-challenged process. No wonder, then, that progress is slow and advancements are incremental. We should not be surprised either that given the political and bureaucratic nature of the organization, there are limits to what can be expected in terms of procedural improvements.[8] This does not mean that we shouldn't keep trying to improve, but neither should we discount the progress that has been made in the last ten years in new and very difficult circumstances.

In short, today's PSOs should be judged not only against some future ideal or even what the present context demands, but also against the recent past and the enormous challenges that the UN has faced this decade. By that measure, as we will see from an examination of recent PSO mandates, striking progress has been made in some areas.

Peacekeeping Yesterday and Today

Interview with Col. Michael Snell and David Angell, Canada's Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, December 7, 1998.

In January 1949, unarmed UN military observers were deployed to the border between India and Pakistan to patrol and observe a cease-fire line in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. UNMOGIP's functions were to observe, report, and investigate complaints of cease-fire violations and submit its finding to each party and to the Secretary-General. Seven-years later the first armed peacekeeping troops (UNEF I) were deployed to the Middle East during the Suez Crisis to secure and supervise a cease-fire between Egypt on one side and Britain, France and Israel on the other.

For forty years, until 1989, peacekeeping fell into the pattern that these operations set. Prior to the UNTAG mission to Namibia, peacekeepers primarily conducted one of four jobs: *internal pacification* to prevent the renewal of fighting in an intra-state conflict; *buffer forces* separating warring parties in an inter-state conflict; *border patrols*, involving cease-fire supervision, fact-finding, reporting, and patrolling; and *observation*, unarmed supervision of a truce, cease-fire, or armistice line.[9] Fifteen such mission were conducted between 1949 and 1989.

In only ten years since 1989, twenty-six missions have been launched. Most of those missions bear little resemblance to the earlier operations in that they contain predominantly civilian elements and their mandates are far more demanding.

Peacekeeping in transition

Peacebuilding activities in peacekeeping operations and civilian participation in them is not new:

- In 1962-63 the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) administered the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian) during the handover of authority from the Netherlands to Indonesia. This civilian effort was complemented by a 1,500 strong United Nations Security Force.

International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook*, New York: Pergamon Press, 1984, p. 31.

- A large *Civilian Operations* component was attached to the mostly disastrous 1960 to 1964 UN mission to the Congo (ONUC). This component was responsible for relief and civil reconstruction and remained after the military peacekeeping forces had left.

- The interminable peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has included both a civilian *Operations Economic* department and a civilian police (UNCIVPOL) component to help maintain law and order; and

- Peacekeeping operations in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Israel-Syria (UNDOF), Gaza (UNEF I), and following the 1973 Middle East war (UNEF II) all engaged in peacebuilding-type activities, from involvement in civic affairs to the provision of humanitarian relief.[10]

Still, the point of departure for the current trend in multi-disciplinary peace support operations is generally agreed to be the relatively recent undertaking in Namibia in 1989. There, UNTAG was deployed to supervise and oversee elections that established the country independent of South Africa. Election observers, civilian police (CIVPOL) constitutional experts, and an international jurist spearheaded the mission whose activities, again, were complemented by a UN military force that provided security leading up to and during the elections. A civilian Special Representative of the UN Secretary General (SRSG) headed the mission instead of the military commander, a rare though not unheard of arrangement at the time.

The timing of UNTAG -- just as the Cold War was winding down -- and its success, emboldened the UN to undertake similar civilian-military operations in the Africa, Central America, and, most ambitiously, Cambodia. Taken together, these missions provide a template for some of the PSOs we are seeing today. They improvised on the Namibian precedent in ways that opened the door to broader peacebuilding during peace support operations.

ONUCA AND ONUSAL

For a fuller description of these and other peacekeeping operations with civilian components see: Robin Hay, "Civilian Aspects of United Nations Peacekeeping." Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security *Background Paper,* No 38 (October 1991).

The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) was a more or less conventional peacekeeping operation, while the United Nations Observer Group in El Salvador (ONUSAL) went beyond traditional peacekeeping. ONUCA was a military operation established in December 1989 to monitor compliance by the signatories with the security aspects of the Esquipulas II peace accord in Central America. It was, however, accompanied by both a civilian International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV) to assist in the demobilization of the contras in Nicaragua, and an election supervisory component, the United Nations Observer Mission for Verification of Elections in Nicaragua (ONUVEN).

Like UNTAG in Namibia, the tasks of the military component of ONUCA were similar to those traditionally associated with peacekeeping. It is worth noting, however, that the Chief Military Observer for ONUCA did participate with the head of ONUVEN in negotiations between the outgoing and incoming Nicaraguan governments, and the National Resistance following the election. ONUCA also collaborated with civilian UN agencies in offering material inducements for demobilization including food, temporary housing and basic social services. Finally, ONUCA provided police training to demobilized National Resistance members.

ONUSAL, with its human rights verification mandate and its emphasis on judicial, military and police reform, undertook a role unprecedented in UN history. It moved peacekeeping further into the areas of peacebuilding and democratization.[11] And it introduced the notion that

human rights monitoring could serve, not only as a component of a UN peace support operation but could be central to such undertakings While ONUSAL consisted mostly of civilians (human rights observers, legal and political advisers and educators) it included fifteen military liaison officers and twenty-seven police advisers (the total strength projected for these two components was 1000). With other UN agencies, ONUSAL also focused its efforts on socio-economic development in El Salvador.

In the early 1990s, both ONUCA and ONUSAL illustrated the need for even further-reaching peacekeeping mandates, where possible, emphasizing peacebuilding in depth. Indeed, Stephen Baranyi and Liisa North argued that ONUCA and ONUSAL were illustrative of why peacekeeping must be combined with effective peacebuilding if conflicts are to be resolved, not just managed temporarily:[12]

> ...while the shooting wars have stopped in Nicaragua and El Salvador...many of the structural underpinnings of conflict remain, and the progress which has been achieved in some areas remains fragile. This is obvious in the case of the region's dramatic socio-economic inequalities, but it is also true with respect to human rights violations, military praetorianism and other conflict sustaining features of Central American societies.

MINUGUA

Human rights violations as a conflict sustaining feature in Central America were addressed head on in the 1994 UN Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). Established by the General Assembly, a rare but not unheard of occurrence, MINUGUA was directed specifically to address a persistent pattern of human rights abuses in the country. It carried out both verification and institution-building activities, employing more than 250 human rights monitors, legal experts, police, and indigenous specialists. In verification, MINUGUA monitored compliance of the government and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) to both the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and human rights aspects of the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

In a reversal of the usual process, the civilian operation was in 1997 joined by a group of 155 UN military observers dispatched to verify the ceasefire in Guatemala. In March 1998 MINUGUA mandate was expanded to verify all aspects of the peace accord. This necessitated the creation of five separate verification areas: human rights; indigenous affairs; social, economic, and agrarian; strengthening of civilian power and role of the army in a democratic society; and resettlement and integration. In MINUGUA, peacebuilding led the way while peacekeeping assumed the role of add-on. MINUGUA also firmly incorporated human rights as a critical aspect in building peace. The fact that the mission was established at the behest of the General Assembly, which claims responsibility for peacebuilding over the Security Council, may serve

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Baranyi and North, *supra* note 2.

as a worthwhile precedent for attempts to entrench peacebuilding into future PSO mandates.

UNTAC

The UN operation in Cambodia set a precedent of a different sort. In conception at least, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) carried peacekeeping beyond peacebuilding into nation-building. It was one of the largest, most ambitious (and expensive!) full- service peacekeeping operations ever, involving seven components: human rights, electoral, military, civil administration, civilian police (CIVPOL), repatriation, and rehabilitation. Together these components were responsible for supervising the peace agreement, administering the country during the transition period, attending the birth of democracy through the holding of an election, and initiating, through rehabilitation efforts, the reconstruction of Cambodia.

The civilian aspects of UNTAC clearly focused on a number of peacebuilding activities that could be interpreted as precursors for today's operations. CIVPOL's duties, for instance, included protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supervising the local police force to ensure the effective and impartial implementation of law and order. It trained local forces in basic police methods and traffic-control procedures and provided special training to police officers and judges in human rights and the implementation of the new Cambodian penal code.

The repatriation program of UNTAC emphasized "Quick Impact Projects" focusing on infrastructure, health, water, agriculture and education. The rehabilitation program concentrated on food security, health, housing, training, education, transportation, and the restoration of basic infrastructure, including public utilities. The military component and CIVPOL also supported information\education activities of UNTAC, helping to distribute audio-visual material throughout the country.

III. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TODAY

MINURSO in the Western Sahara

The peacekeeping operation in the Western Sahara followed close on the heels of the UN's successful undertaking in Namibia. The Settlement Plan of 1988 that MINURSO was established to implement called for an interim ceasefire between Morocco, which was then (and still is) occupying the territory, and their POLISARIO adversaries. It also called for a process to ensure that the people of the territory were able to express their will on the issue of self-determination in a free and fair referendum.

More specifically, the peace plan asked that a Special Representative of the Secretary General, currently Mr. Charles Dunbar of the United States, be solely responsible for organizing and conducting a referendum -- and ensuring that when it took place, it did so in a free and fair environment -- in which the people could choose between independence and integration with Morocco. The SRSG was to be assisted in this task by a UN civilian military support group. In addition to a ceasefire, an exchange of prisoners between the two sides, and the cantonment of troops, the plan called for the return, assisted by the UN, of refugees and other Western Saharan residents after their right to vote had been established. The peace plan also called for the UN to monitor administration of the territory especially the maintenance of law and order.

MINURSO's mandate, as spelled out in Security Council Resolution 658, pointed to a truly composite military-civilian operation that has been tasked with fulfilling all the elements of the Settlement Plan, including: monitoring a cease-fire between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front; verifying the reduction of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara; monitoring the confinement of both sides' troops to specified locations; ensuring the release of all Western Saharan political prisoners or detainees; overseeing the exchange of prisoners of war; implementing the repatriation program, identifying and registering qualified voters, and organizing, ensuring, and proclaiming the results a free and fair referendum.

MINURSO is comprised of military observers, armed troops, a civilian component. And local staff. Its civilian component includes an Identification Commission, a Referendum Commission, a Repatriation Component, and civilian police.

Analysis

MINURSO has been dragging on for nearly eight full years now. A referendum was originally scheduled to take place in the early 1990s, but the process leading to that event has failed to breech the starting gate. While the SRSG was appointed to take full charge of referendum preparations during the transitional period following the ceasefire, the parties in conflict have squabbled over voter eligibility, blocking commencement even of the transitional period. MINURSO seems to have spent much of its time trying to identify those who are eligible to vote.

The operation in Western Sahara may yet prove successful once the parties agree on a way to resolve their differences over voter eligibility. Still, it has been a considerable drain on the financial resources of the UN, with a proposed budget of $65.1 million for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 alone. Not surprisingly as of September 1998 the overall budget shortfall for the mission stood at $55 million.

MINURSO shows the importance of dotting the Is and crossing the Ts in any settlement plan and ensuring that both parties share common perspectives on each element and are committed to implementing the agreement. This was not the case in the Western Sahara. As the operation began, several issues in the settlement plan remained outstanding, including agreement on who would be eligible to vote, how to get refugees to the polling stations, and the procedure for Moroccan withdrawal should the referendum vote decide against integration.

The decision to move ahead with the peace process, even when certain important issues remained outstanding in the Western Saharan settlement plan, has resulted in another costly, seemingly never-ending peacekeeping operation, which reflects badly on peacekeeping as a whole,

at least in public perceptions.

UNOMIL in Liberia

The savage armed conflict in Liberia that began in 1989 is an archetype of the kinds of internal wars that UN PSOs are established to help resolve. Civilians have been the primary victims, numbering up to 150,000 killed. Law and order broke down completely during the war. Refugees numbering 700,000 flooded into neighbouring countries and untold numbers of people were internally displaced.

At the same time, a subregional organization -- the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) -- took the lead in settling the conflict establishing a Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) in 1990. UNOMIL was established three years later under Security Council resolution 866 to help ECOMOG implement the Cotonou Peace Agreement.[13]

UNOMIL contained both military and civilian components, the latter of which included political, humanitarian, and electoral personnel. The mission was led by an SRSG to whom the military commander reported. The office of the SRSG was filled respectively by Trevor Livingston Gordon-Somers (Jamaica) from November 1992 to November 1994; Anthony B. Nyakyi (United Republic of Tanzania) from December 1994 to April 1997; and Tuliameni Kalomoh (Namibia) from April to September 1997. UNOMIL's mandate stressed full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMIL and ECOMOG. Established originally for seven months, UNOMIL was to comprise military observers as well as medical, engineering, communications, transportation and electoral components. It was to:

- observe and verify both presidential and legislative elections;
- assist in the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of combatants;
- assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with existing

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Subsequently amended and supplemented by the Abuja Agreement of 1995.

UN humanitarian relief operations;

- report on violations of humanitarian law; and
- train ECOMOG engineers in mine clearance

In 1995, UNOMIL's mandate was modified by Security Council Resolution 1020 to include investigation and reporting on violations of human rights. It was also tasked with assisting local human rights groups, as appropriate, in raising voluntary contributions for training and logistic support.

In a report to the Security Council on September 13, 1995, the Secretary General pointed to several elements that he considered crucial for the success of the peace process in Liberia. Those included international assistance in rebuilding the country's economy and infrastructure and strengthening governmental institutions. He also stressed the importance of disarmament and demobilization of Liberia's estimated 50,000 to 60,000 combatants, of whom as many as 25 per cent were children, and their effective reintegration into civilian life.

There were a number of striking peacebuilding elements in the UNOMIL operation, not least of which was the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) aspect. As Mats Berdal points out, DDR is central to peacebuilding, given that war over time imposes a social and economic order all its own. Successful DDR depends on ensuring that those who have benefited from this social order (warring parties and their soldiers) believe that their physical and economic security will not be adversely affected by "relinquishing arms and abandoning what for many is not just a profession, but also a way of life."[14]

Civilians played an important role in the DDR process in Liberia. The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office set up a Demobilization and Reintegration Unit (HACO). This unit was responsible for coordinating and managing the provision of food health, services, shelter

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Mats R. Berdal, "Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars. arms, soldiers and the termination of armed conflicts." London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Adelphi Paper* 303 (1996), p. 73.

water and sanitation for the demobilization centres. It also coordinated bridging activities with local authorities, UN agencies and international and local NGOs. HACO also chaired the Task Force on Demobilization and Reintegration, which was comprised of UNOMIL, UN agencies, ECOMOG, the Liberian National Disarmament and Demobilization Commission, and representatives of the European Union, USAID, and international and national NGOs. The Task Force established subcommittees to deal with child soldiers and resettlement. UNICEF working with UNOMIL took the lead on this issue.

UNOMIL also included a human rights officer who provided assistance to the SRSG in fulfilling the human rights aspect of the mandate. In addition to the duties prescribed by its mandate in this regard, UNOMIL worked with the Liberian Ministry of Justice, UNDP, and the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch of the UN Secretariat in Vienna to examine ways in which the Liberian justice system could be strengthened.

Finally, UNOMIL assisted ECOWAS in developing an electoral framework and holding elections. A UN technical survey team was dispatched in December 1996 to identify what steps would be needed to create a viable and credible framework for free and fair elections. Elections were held in July 1997 with UNOMIL's Electoral Division supporting the efforts of ECOWAS, who organized and conducted the elections.

Still, the most prominent feature of UNOMIL was the fact that it cooperated with a regional organization that took the lead. These types of arrangements are likely to be a prominent feature of PSOs in the future, and as we shall see, are not without their drawbacks and pitfalls.

Analysis

The war in Liberia may give rise to an adage: the longer and bloodier the war, and the more bloodthirsty the combatants who wage it, the greater the need for a truly comprehensive peace support operation to rebuild the peace (it is true of conflicts in Angola and Sierra Leone

as well). A Liberian peace seemed to demand every element of the peacebuilding repertoire -- in spades -- from disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, through demining and dealing with child soldiers, to human rights monitoring and elections. A full grab bag.

The results have been mixed, primarily because the UN came late and as a secondary partner to an operation that had, until then, been conducted by a subregional organization – for six years. The resolution establishing the mission explicitly acknowledges the secondary role and late arrival of the UN. For instance, it assigns ECOMOG primary responsibility for "supervising the implementation of the military provisions of the Agreement and envisages the United Nations role shall be to monitor and verify this process." Elsewhere it notes that UNOMIL will be the first peacekeeping mission undertaken by the UN in cooperation with a peacekeeping mission *already set up by another organization* (emphasis added), in this case ECOWAS. The Security Council also commended ECOWAS for its continuing efforts to restore, peace, security and stability in Liberia.

While regional organizations are considered by many to be the wave of the future in peacekeeping they are for the most part less than adept at these types of missions not to mention at peacebuilding. For instance, while the mandate of ECOMOG was to create the conditions for free and fair elections, few of the governments contributing troops to the force were democratically elected themselves.[15] Moreover, ECOMOG forces frequently engaged in a pattern of human rights abuses and transgressions -- including excessive use of force at checkpoints, torture during interrogation, and beatings in detention sometimes resulting in death -- which their officers often failed to address.

By coming late to the field, the UN in effect ceded control of the operation. ECOWAS was not established under Security Council authorization and was not required to keep the Council fully informed of its activities, as is normally the case in UN operations. Coordination

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See: Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia. ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping." *International Security*, Vol. 21 No. 3 (Winter 96/97), p. 62.

between UNOMIL and ECOMOG was also lacking in the beginning since no mechanism was established for such. This raised serious problems for the UN in its efforts to achieve its peacebuilding agenda in Liberia. For instance, the UN was not involved in negotiating the time frame for elections that it was suppose to supervise and observe. Similarly, UNOMIL was at a loss as to what to do in the face of ECOMOG human rights transgressions.

The question to ask when considering the increase in regional and subregional involvement in peace support operations is, do these organizations have the resources, skills, commitment, and will to conduct PSOs according to UN principles, design and Charter requirements? When the UN abdicates in favour of regional intervention, this is something it will have less control over.

UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone

Security Council Resolution 1181 established UNOMSIL for six-months beginning in July 1998. Mr. Francis G. Okelo (Uganda) was appointed chief of the mission and Special Representative of the Secretary General. The priority in Sierra Leone, as the Secretary General reported to the Council in June, is to promote stability and security by disarming and demobilizing former combatants. Overall authority for the mission resides in the hands of an SRSG. Again the UN finds itself working with ECOWAS and ECOMOG. Again, too, this PSO includes distinctive and strong civilian peacebuilding elements.

Security Council resolution 1181 was particularly concerned with the plight of civilians in the Sierra Leone conflict. It expressed grave concern over the immense suffering and deaths that the conflict had visited upon refugees, displaced persons and especially children. It condemned the continuing violence against civilians carried out by the ousted junta and called for a process of national reconciliation to end the war.

In this effort, UNOMSIL is mandated to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone and provide the SRSG with regular information on that situation. An initial group of 40 observers was established to do this with more being deployed as the security situation

permits. Furthermore the military observers are to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants and monitor the role of ECOMOG in the provision of security and in the collection and destruction of arms in secure areas. As in UNOMIL, the observers in Sierra Leone are also charged with monitoring respect for international humanitarian law. Finally, the military component is asked to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of the Civil Defense Forces (CDF).

The civilian component of the operation is mandated to advise the government and police officials on police practice, training, re-equipment and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect internationally accepted standards of policing in democratic societies. It will also advise on and monitor the progress of police reform and restructuring in Sierra Leone. Finally, the civilian element of UNOMSIL is to report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights and assist the Government in addressing human rights needs.

It should also be noted that Resolution 1181 encourages the international community to assist and participate in the longer term task of reconstruction and economic and social recovery and development in Sierra Leone. It also welcomes efforts of the Sierra Leone government to coordinate an effective national response to the needs of children affected by the conflict. Along these lines, the resolution also welcomes the efforts of the Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict to make Sierra Leone "one of the pilot projects for a more concerted and effective response to the needs of children in the context of post-conflict peacebuilding".

Analysis

The conflict continues to rumble and flare in Sierra Leone and peacebuilding has hardly begun to make an impact. Again the UN is working with ECOWAS and ECOMOG, who hardly seem up to the task of defeating the rebels.[16] What is striking about the mandate and the Security

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Patricia Fortier, *Deployment: Crisis and Credibility. Notes from recent crises: Kosovo, Central America, Africa, Indonesia, and Iraq*. An informal discussion paper (unpublished).

Council resolution establishing it, is the explicit attention to the need to protect civilians, especially children, from the brutality of war. 1181 recognizes that civilians are the main victims of the war. It pays special attention to children and calls for support for national programs and for the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict. Indeed, given the increase in child soldiers and the impact of many wars on children generally, 1181 offers a precedent for including children's needs in future post-conflict peacebuilding PSOs.

MINURCA in the Central African Republic

The UN mission to the Central African Republic has been hailed by one analyst as Canada's return to peacekeeping in Africa in a country which he also says is a financial outcast, ruined by years of government corruption and political instability, and on the brink of sliding into the kind of violent turmoil that engulfs its neighbours.[17]

Established by Security Council Resolution 1159 in April 1998, MINURCA is to assist in maintaining and enhancing security and stability, including freedom of movement in the city of Bangui and the immediate vicinity. It is also expected to heop maintain law and order, supervise\control storage\monitor the final disposition of all weapons, assist in a short-term police trainers program and in capacity-building efforts of the national police, and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police forces. Finally, MINURCA is tasked with providing advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies.

Notable about the mandate is that the SRSG, Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji of Nigeria, has been appointed with his own very strong and specific peacebuilding mandate, which is:

a) To assist in the promotion of the reforms necessary to achieve national reconciliation, security and stability in the country;

Andrew McGregor, "Peacekeeping in the Central African Republic: Canada's Quiet Return to a Troubled Continent." Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, *Behind the Headlines*, Vol. 55 No. 4, p. 18.

b) To head MINURCA;

c) To have overall authority over all United Nations activities in the Central African Republic, in support of MINURCA's mandate;
d) To provide good offices and mediation between the Government and political parties;

e) To provide advice and facilitate technical assistance in the areas of good governance and the rule of law;
f) To cooperate with other international partners, including international financial institutions, with the objective of supporting activities aimed at establishing the foundations for lasting peace, national reconstruction and development; and
g) To encourage the United Nations agencies and programs to provide assistance to the Central African Republic, in particular in the areas referred to in the report of the Secretary General.

Notable, too, is the paragraph in resolution 1159 that forms part of the Security Council rationale for establishing MINURCA and giving it the kind of mandate it has. That paragraph states:

> Recognizing the link between peace and development and that a sustained commitment by the international community to assist and support the economic, social, and institutional development of the Central African Republic is indispensable for long-term peace and stability in the country, and in that regard welcoming the cooperation between the Government of the Central African Republic and the international financial institutions in developing an economic reform programme.[18]

Peacebuilding was intended as a central element, if not the central element, of the MINURCA operation. In his January 1998 report to the Security Council prior to the establishment of the mission, the UN Secretary General wrote that in addition to its military role the prospective UN mission should cooperate with other international actors in support of all activities aimed at laying a foundation for lasting peace. More specifically he noted that the mission would facilitate the provision of technical assistance and support by the United Nations system for national reconciliation efforts and the rehabilitation and effective functioning of

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Security Council Resolution 1159 (1998), (http://www.un.org/plweb-cgi/idoc2.pl), p. 2.

accountable and democratic institutions, including assistance and advice on constitutional and human rights issues. He noted, too, that close collaboration with the UNDP, international financial institutions and bilateral donors would be essential in "promoting an integrated approach to post-conflict peace-building in the Central African Republic." He proposed the establishment of a special United Nations Trust Fund for this purpose.[19]

Analysis

Perhaps most striking about MINURCA is the comprehensive peacebuilding mandate given to the SRSG above and beyond his leadership of the PSO. Indeed, he was given "overall authority over all United Nations activities in the Central African Republic, in support of MINURCA's mandate." Thus, the SRSG is placed at the centre of peacebuilding not just in the PSO but in the country. In the absence of formal mechanisms for coordination this arrangment provides the SRSG with the power (in theory) to ensure that all those peacebuilding elements work together.

Also notable in resolution 1181 is its reference to the need for a sustained commitment by the international community to the Central African Republic, something that is considered indispensable for long-term peace and stability in the country. This reference flags the importance of linking IFI involvement in economic reform in a conflict torn country to the peace and security effort. This has not always been the case and the disconnect between the two processes does not serve either well.[20] Moreover, IFI involvement in peacebuilding and linking

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Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1136 (1997) Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic, 23 January 1998, par. 31 (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc /reports/1998/s199861.htm).

See: Alvaro de Soto and Graciana del Castillo, "Obstacles to Peacebuilding." *Foreign Policy*, No 94 (Spring 1994), pp. 69-83. The authors argue that often the economic stabilization programs run by the IMF clash with peace programs run by the UN, so that countries, El Salvador for instance, are faced with the dilemma of choosing between the two. See also: Timothy M. Shaw, "Beyond Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: What Links to Sustainable Development and Human Security?" *International Peacekeeping* (Special Issue: Beyond the Emergency: Development Within UN Peace Missions), Vol. 3 No. 2

that involvement to the PSO, means that these organizations would be an appropriate source for bridge funding for peacebuilding once the PSO leaves.

UNTAES in Croatia

The United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) is perhaps a model of modern peacebuilding PSOs. It was established in response to the 1995 Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, which sought the peaceful integration of that region into Croatia. The Agreement further requested the Security Council to establish a transitional administration to govern the region during a transitional period, and to authorize an international force to maintain peace and security and assist in the implementation of the Agreement.

On January 15 1996, UN Security Council Resolution 1037 established UNTAES to govern the region for an initial period of 12 months, which could be extended to two years at the request of one of the parties. The transitional administration was to help reintegrate the region peacefully into Croatia's legal and constitutional system. While reaffirming that Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium were integral parts of the Republic of Croatia, resolution 1037 also stressed the importance of full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in those territories.

Notable about Security Council Resolution 1037 is that it instructed UNTAES, over and above its core mandate, to monitor the parties commitment in the Basic Agreement to respect the highest standards of human rights and fundamental freedoms and promote an atmosphere of confidence among all local residents irrespective of their ethnic origin. The resolution also stipulated that the Security Council could reconsider the mandate of UNTAES if it at any time it received a report from the Secretary-General that the parties had significantly failed to comply with their obligations under the Basic Agreement. Significantly, the resolution called for close

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(Summer 1996), pp. 38-48.

coordination with UNTAES by all international organizations and agencies in the region. Lastly, it implored States and IFIs to support and cooperate with efforts to promote development and economic reconstruction in the region.

UNTAES had an authorized strength of 5,000 troops, 100 military observers and 600 civilian police. Its combined civilian-military mandate was to:

- supervise and help in the demilitarization of the region;
- oversee the return of refugees and displaced persons;
- establish and train a temporary police force to build professionalism among the police;
- monitor the prison system and the treatment of offenders;
- organize elections for all local government bodies;
- maintain international monitors along the international borders of the region to facilitate free movement;
- restore the normal functioning of all public service in the region;
- monitor the parties' commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- cooperate with the international Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its task of investigating and prosecuting war crimes; and
- promote the realization of the commitments made in the Basic Agreement between Croatia and local Serb authorities and contribute to the overall maintenance of peace and security.

But a simple review of the mandate barely does the civilian component of UNTAES justice in peacebuilding terms. Rather than an SRSG, Mr. Willian Walker of the United States was appointed Transitional Administrator with complete authority over both the civilian and military components of the operation. These components worked closely together often sharing resources and co-locating support teams.

The civilian police component as the mandate indicated had to establish and train a Transitional Police Force (TPF), defining its structure and size, developing a training program and overseeing its implementation. The training courses included a focus on human rights. The challenge was to achieve a balance between Croats and local Serbs that reflected the population ratio in the region, meaning 40 per cent each of Croats and Serbs and 20 per cent of other minorities. By the end of the operation the TPF comprised 815 Croat officers, 811 Serbs, and

52 officers representing other ethnic minorities.[21]

A Human Rights Monitoring Unit was established as a part of UNTAES, though not until August of 1997. In the meantime, CIVPOL played an important role in monitoring human rights, reassuring local residents that their rights would be respected during criminal investigations and while in custody. UNTAES conducted human rights training programs, including a human rights seminar sponsored by the Council of Europe and conducted by the operation's Joint Implementation Committee on Human Rights. The rights of refugees and internally displaced were monitored by both CIVPOL and UNTAES military observers.

UNTAES participated in or sponsored economic reconstruction efforts, which Jacques Klein the Transitional Administrator considered critical to lay the basis for lasting peace and reconciliation. Besides hosting events such as Donors meetings that raised more than $50 million dollars for economic reconstruction, UNTAES carried out or facilitated specific projects, including the reconnection of telephone lines between towns, re-opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, and reconnecting the Adriatic Oil Pipeline between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

UNTAES engaged in a host of other peacebuilding activities too numerous to mention in detail. Very quickly they included among others, de-mining, weapons buy-back programs as a part of demilitarization, civil affairs efforts that included everything from facilitating family reunions to overseeing and coordinating the work of local government bodies. And finally, in April 1997, it successfully conducted elections at the municipal and local level simultaneously throughout Croatia. In this effort it deployed more than 150 observers to all polling stations. They were complemented by 30 OSCE observer teams along with observers from the Council of Europe and diplomats.

Lessons Learned Unit Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) January 1996 - January 1998. Lessons Learned July 1998*, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information (1998), p. 17.

Analysis

By most accounts, UNTAES was an unqualified success. It is an example of one of the more comprehensive and intrusive of recent PSOs, which benefited in its operations by the parties' commitment to fulfilling the terms of the Basic Agreement. Human rights monitoring was a prominent aspect of the operation that UNTAES implemented effectively by involving local organizations and individuals in the implementing committee. The electoral process, too, was a success in part because the people and parties involved were given some responsibility for managing the process.

What is most striking about the operations was its depth and the thoroughness with which its mandate was implemented. UNTAES seemed to be everywhere doing everything from the reintegration of public institutions, to involvement in education and culture. It also operated innovatively, for instance in its organization of a marketplace where people from all sides in the conflict could come together and trade goods. Finally, the operation was notable in that it provided for successor arrangements once the PSO had left. This arrangement highlighted once again the growing importance of CIVPOL in modern PSOs and in providing continuity to a peacebuilding exercise: The successor to UNTAES is the United Nations Civilian Police Support Group set up to monitor police operations in the Danube region and to help further professionalize the multi-ethnic police forces.

IV. PROGRESS, CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Progress

Since 1995 only three UN peace support operations have been mandated. The complex nature of these operations, their heavy requirements in human and financial resources, and the potential for disaster when the UN intervenes in internal wars, means that the organization will

move in a considered manner and practice due diligence before approving any new ones.[22] Those that are approved, however, will no doubt be civilian-military in composition and peacebuilding in focus. This has been the trend for the last ten years and it seems to be only increasing in intensity.

We need to remember, however, that intepositionary types of peacekeeping operations held sway for some forty-years. Indeed, that approach still characterizes the role that military peacekeeping forces play, even in modern missions. Remember, too, that today's operations may be drastically different from pre-1989 missions but they are not a reinvention of the wheel. PSOs are an outgrowth of traditional peacekeeping, slowly making advances and adapting to new situations and requirements. Change comes about slowly in highly politicized organizations such as the UN, so before looking at some of the challenges it is important to understand and recognize the progress that has been made.

Overall, what is most significant perhaps is the intellectual development that has taken place only a decade. It is clear from a review of the literature and from talking to practitioners in Ottawa and New York that everyone involved in PSOs today, from the military to those working in development agencies, consider these missions to be civilian-military affairs with peacebuilding as an integral feature.[23] The same could not be said ten-years ago when following the operation in Namibia those involved in the mission from the UN in New York to the election monitors in the field were clearly under the impression that composite peacekeeping missions were something new, innovative, and, for some, perhaps even a little subversive.[24]

note 5, p. 179,180.

Progress at the United Nations

We should also be aware that not inconsiderable improvements have taken place in the management and planning for these operations. In 1993 the Mission Planning Service was established as a part of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) at the UN. Responsible for providing advice in the planning of missions, it works with other units of DPKO, for instance CIVPOL, as well as with specialists from other UN departments and agencies, along with NGOS, in designing carefully integrated civilian-military plans for complex multidimensional operations. A Policy and Analysis Unit was established in 1993 providing research to the department. Two Assistant Secretary-General offices have been created each with political and military desk officers for peacekeeping operations A twenty-four hour Situation Centre established in 1993 keeps field missions in touch with UN headquarters. [25]

Notable, too, have been improvements on the humanitarian side, including:

- the establishment and recent strengthening of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), composed of UN and non-governmental agencies and intended to provide a more rapid and coordinated response to humanitarian emergencies, including a strategic approach emphasizing the contribution that humanitarian assistance can make to peacemaking and peacebuilding;

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- the creation of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) and of the office of an Emergency Relief Coordinator. In 1997, the DHA became the Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the ERC's coordination role was enhanced; [26]

- in 1994, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights was established and is now among four departments, along with the Department of Political Affairs, the DPKO, and the OCHA, responsible for responding to complex emergencies.

Other new measures include:

- the Rapid Deployable Mission Headquarters (RDMH), developed in 1996, which when implemented, would deploy, immediately upon authorization of a new operation, an essential core of civilian and military personnel to manage the initial phases of an operation;

- the Stand-by arrangement system (SBAS), a data-base of resources that individual states can make available to the UN on short-notice; and

- the Multinational Stand-By Forces High Readiness Brigrade (SHIRBRIG), involving ten countries and intended to allow for the rapid deployment of a brigade to the mission area.

In peacebuilding, too, the UN has begun to make improvements consonant with the growing attention the organization is paying to that area of activity. In his 1997, *Programme for Reform*, Secretary General Kofi Annan noted that the UN has come to understand the necessity of taking a comprehensive approach to promoting peace and human security, deploying in an integrated fashion the political, human rights, military, humanitarian and developmental assets of the organization. He bemoaned the lack of resources and political will that undermined past UN efforts at complex peacekeeping operations admonishing that "peacekeeping will remain an indispensable instrument of the United Nations and it is thus crucial to maintain the Organization's capacity to plan, manage, and conduct these operations efficiently and successfully."[27] In that spirit, the Secretary General noted that while the civilian-military integration within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is being tightened, there is a need for more resources to consolidate efforts to plan and prepare operations through to

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particular reform has not met with universal approval. See: Thomas G. Weiss, "Humanitarian Shell Games: Whither UN Reform?" *Security Dialogue,* Vol. 29 No. 1 (March 1998), p. 9-23.

Renewing the United Nations: A Programme of Reform. Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly 16 July 1997 (A/51/950), par. 106.

implementation, closure, and post-mission analysis.

In the same document, Mr. Annan confirmed the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), convenor of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), as the focal point at the UN for post-conflict peacebuilding. In the interest of coordination, he noted the need for DPA to work closely with the OHCHR, DPKO, UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank. The ECPS itself, in collaboration with other Executive Committees as appropriate, was made responsible for designing and implementing post-conflict peacebuilding.

The appointment of DPA as the focal point for peacebuilding is belied somewhat by the fact that it is not a full participant in the "strategic frameworks" initiative of the UNDP and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). This initiative, launched in 1997, is attempting to develop greater coordination in field operations involving humanitarian, political, and development activities.[28]

Two other notable developments that support the peacebuilding intentions of the UN are:

- the creation of a Strategic Planning Unit to address, study, and provide policy information on emerging global issues; and
- consultations with the President of the World Bank to strengthen cooperation andcoordination between the Bank and the United Nations.

Clearly not all of these improvements and mechanisms work as well as one might like. As Colonel Roger Little, the head of the Mission Planning Service noted, the UN is an organization with Charter limitations and a 185 member Board of Directors, so to an extent it will always be working within constraints. Change is also difficult because people, agencies and organizations that should be cooperating and coordinating in these missions often have their own agendas and turf to protect. It is interesting to note in this regard that the different Executive

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See: John G. Cockell, *Peacebuilding and Human Security - Frameworks for International Responses to Internal Conflicts* (unpublished paper), p.17-18.

Committees established in 1997 all have an interest in peacebuilding.[29] It remains to be seen how

they coordinate those interests -- or not -- but the Strategic Frameworks experience does not bode well. And clearly, the enormous complexity of PSOs and the multiplicity of actors involved, including NGOs outside the UN family, only further complicates the coordination of PSOs in the field and at UN headquarters in New York.

Progress in the Field

As the mandates from the abovementioned PSOs indicate, peacebuilding is integral to all of the new missions. One of the most significant indicators of this is the tendency for the Secretary General to appoint a civilian Special Representative as a head of mission in the field. Ten-years ago the idea that everyone in a peacekeeping mission would report to the SRSG would have been considered ludicrous.[30] Today it is *de rigeur*, especially in those situations where the UN has been asked to play a peacebuilding role.

The success of many operations depends on the effectiveness of the SRSG who acts as the centre of operational relationships in the field between the UN Secretariat, the wider UN family of agencies, funds and programs, other international organizations, the parties to the conflict and donor countries. The *ad hoc* nature of many missions, places responsibility for coordination of the operations many elements squarely in his or her hands.

It should be noted, too, that while improvisation continues to characterize many missions, civilian-military coordination does take place in the field. In many of the more recent operations, civil-military cooperation centres have been established to foster this type of cooperation.[31] Indeed, the Canadian Department of National Defence has developed a lengthy manual on all

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four committees are on Peace and Security, Humanitarian Affairs, Economic and Social Affairs, and Development Operations.

Interview with Snell and Angell, December 7, 1998.

Interview with Lt.Col Don Lecarte and Commander Bob Edwards, Department of National Defence November 24, 1998.

aspects of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), which pays due attention to peacebuilding.[32] Joint Implementation Committees in UNTAES were used to bring local actors in that mission into dialogue on peaceful reintegration. The pooling of civil and military resource, joint briefing sessions, co-location of civil and military elements of the mission was also a highlight of UNTAES. In Rwanda, the Force Commander set up liaison teams to advise him on the civilian side of the operation. This team included political, humanitarian, legal, and human rights advisors.

Still, coordination remains a problem in operations, as the IPA has noted, where a multiplicity of UN actors is present and where humanitarian, military, political, human rights and development activities are all taking place:

> There are far too many examples of inter-agency and inter-entity rivalry in the field impeding progress by any UN actor and exacerbating what is often an already negative perception of the UN on the part of the local population. Overlapping mandates often result in tension and the ability of multi-faceted operations to function on the ground is frequently determined by the quality of the personnel and the leadership on the ground, rather than by contingency plans or formulae for operations. This is equally the case for the specialized agencies as it is for the military and civilian components of an operation.[33]

It is especially critical to remember in today's PSOs that coordination has both space and time dimensions. The very nature of peacebuilding means that operations need to consider the transition to longer term peacebuilding. This can often be a problem when UN missions are subject to limited mandates and hostage to exit strategies from the outset. Yet peacebuilding is a long-term process. Time and again interviewees, whether military or civilian, stressed the need to look and think in the long term. As Kumar states, the question is how to build in

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Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War. Ottawa: Department of National Defence (1998), p. 1-7..

Michéle Griffin, *supra* note 11, p. 15.

sustainability.[34]

This will require strategic thinking and planning from the beginning of an operation and maybe even before. It will also require an emphasis where possible on capacity-building, working with local actors, and institutionalizing peacebuilding as far as possible. As Michael Doyle writes, using elections as an example, voters are only powerful for the five minutes it takes to vote unless there is an institutional mechanism to translate democratic authority into bureaucratic practice.[35] Resources are bound to come into question here. The need is to bring all the appropriate resources to bear at the appropriate stages. Thus, after the PSO leaves responsibility should be handed to development agencies and banks for funding follow-on efforts. This means, these organizations will need to be in on the planning from the start, including where possible planning the transition.

Challenges and Tentative Recommendations

Peace support operations are and will continue to be the art of the possible. Impediments to effective and successful missions abound, including a lack of financial and manpower resources at both the United Nations and in Canada and a UN system that is rife with politics and turf protection. There are no easy fixes to these problems. Given these obstacles we need to be clear-eyed about the challenges we face and realistic about the solutions. It is of little practical help, especially in the short-term, to suggest as Thomas Franck did recently that the solution to the UN's problems in PSOs is to create a permanent UN military and civilian cadre -- consisting of 20,000 military and 10,000 peacebuilding specialists and costing between $2-3 billion per year -- to staff holistic missions. [36] While this is an ideal solution, our purpose here is to focus on what is doable.

Interview with Elizabeth Cousens, Chetan Kumar and Margaret Vogt at the International Peace Academy, New York, December 9, 1998.

Michael W. Doyle, "UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate." New York: International Peace Academy, *Occasional Paper Series* (1995), p. 88.

Thomas M. Franck, *supra* note 3, p. 291.

Challenge 1: Intra-state wars will continue to plague the international system and the call for PSOs to address these situations will grow not shrink.

Canada needs to recognize this challenge and understand that it cannot be everywhere at once. We need to play to our strengths and deploy our resources strategically. This means paying careful attention to the mandate of each operation, reassuring ourselves that it is realistic, doable and flexible enough to allow peacebuilding improvisation (and with discretionary funds provided to the SRSG to make that improvisation possible).

Canada should press to ensure that any operation it gets involved in has an effective and proven SRSG at the helm and that he/she is supported by a deputy(s) who serves as both the humanitarian and development coordinator.[37] Along with a Military Force Commander that reports to the SRSG this arrangement will ensure that at the very least all aspects of the operation, including how they interact, are duly considered at the top in the field. Information sharing and coordination will also be encouraged. In this regard, a transitional coordinator should be appointed to each operation to ensure a smooth handover to humanitarian or development responsibles when the PSO leaves. Alternatively, responsibility for transitional coordination could be made an explicit task of the SRSG's deputy. To avoid turf wars, the terms of reference of the SRSG should be clearly defined and developed in consultation with other agencies in the field.

Challenge 2: Peacebuilding will continue to be a primary feature of PSOs.

Canada has made peacebuilding a prominent aspect of its foreign policy. At the same time it is and has always been closely identified with the institution of peacekeeping. It will be

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For more information on the role of the SRSG in PSOs see: Fafo Programme for International Cooperation and Conflict Resolution, *Recommendations Report of the Forum on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General: Shaping the UN's role in Peace Implementation*, New York 8-9 July 1998.

natural for the United Nations to look to Canada as new operations arise. We need to be prepared both intellectually and operationally to respond.

Operationally we need to look at the mechanisms we have and determine how they can be strengthened. The Civilian Policing arrangement is a good one but underfunded. Police now represent some 25 per cent of UN peacekeepers. If Robert Oakley and company are right they are the wave of the future in peace support operations.[38]

Police contribute in a number of ways to peacebuilding especially with their emphasis on community-policing. They also provide continuity to an operation playing roles in every phase of the transition to development, including in institution-building. Canada should work to bolster its strength in this regard by providing more funding for the Civilian Policing Arrangement. Given the fact however that police manpower in Canada is finite[39] more emphasis might also be given to bringing recipients to Canada for training and increasing the budget for the Police Training and Assistance Program.

At the UN, Canada should push to have a CIVPOL advisor attached to the office of the Secretary General, similar to the arrangement for a military advisor. Canada should also consider CIVPOL secondments to CIDA and or DFAIT.

Human rights, too, will continue to be a constant and prominent feature of the new PSOs. Human rights arrangements and mechanisms need to be built into every mandate including the establishment of Human Rights Monitoring Units or the appointment of a Human Rights Officer where possible; Canada needs to consider ways to mobilize and deploy human rights monitors,

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Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. Washington: National Defense University Press, (1998) 547 pp.

As RCMP Sergeant Doug Coates pointed out, unlike the military, who are supposed to go abroad, police have a job to do here and that is what they are being paid for. Interview with Sgt. Doug Coates, RCMP CIVPOL Unit, November 19, 1998.

perhaps in cooperation with like-minded countries like Norway and Denmark. Canadem is a good start, but it is a roster not a deployment mechanism.

Canada should not undersell the military in terms of peacebuilding. They can move most quickly to an environment and have the requisite skills and training to undertake peacebuilding tasks. While providing security will always be the military's main task, their ability to conduct peacebuilding tasks when civilians are not available to do so should not be ignored.[40] This will also redound to the benefit of the mission overall. Having suffered at the hands of combatants, recipients in war zones are usually wary of the military. Peacebuilding by the military can reassure them and build trust and confidence. The experience of troops in IFOR and SFOR is a good recent example of how civil affairs operations can benefit the people and the mission without creating a dependency.[41] (The same holds true for CIVPOL whose community relations emphasis allows wide scope for initiating or helping to facilitate peacebuilding projects).

While we need to develop better ways to mobilize civilian peacebuilders and deploy them to the mission area as quickly as possible, we would be well advised also to push for the full implementation of such already developed measures such as RDMHQ, SHIRBRIG, and SBAS. In this regard we also need to ensure that those troops and civilians mobilized have the requisite skills to do the job. It is one thing for a soldier to patrol a buffer zone and quite another to provide training in democratic military methods.

> *Challenge 3: The UN, flawed as it is, remains the most experienced organization in the world when it comes to the conduct of peace support operations. Canada must do what it can to support progress and improvements that the organization has undertaken in New York and in the field to better conduct these operations.*

See Robin Hay, "Military and Security Institutions: Challenges in Democratization and Development." Kingston: Queen's University Centre for International Relations, *Martello Paper* (1995).

Peter Caddick-Adams, "Civil Affairs Operations by IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol 5 No.3 (Autumn 1998).

At the UN, Canada should push for peacebuilding mandates for the SRSG that accompany the mandate establishing a mission. This will not only promote peacebuilding as an integral part of an operation, but provides the SRSG with overall authority for peacebuilding among all the UN agencies in the mission area enabling him to harness and coordinate their contribution. Such a mandate will allow the SRSG freedom to improvise within the mission. Again, peacebuilding trust funds that the SRSG can draw on to improvise should also be a regular aspect of each mission. Canada should be among the first to contribute to such trust funds, even if they are not participating in the operation.

Canada should also make the argument for strengthening the capacity of DPKO or at least ensuring that its capacity is not diminished when gratis military officers leave. As it stands, its strength in training will be reduced from eleven officer to two and its police unit will be reduced from seven to two. We should also ensure that DPKO personnel makeup should reflect the complexity of PSOs. While civilian police are represented on the staff no humanitarian officer is in house. This should be corrected. It might also take the lead in mobilizing private sector donations to the UN that could be dedicated to specific aspects of peacebuilding and PSOs and make up for public sector shortfalls.

Canada needs to stress the importance of peacebuilding being sustainable and transferable beyond the life of the PSO. Responsibility and ownership of peacebuilding projects should be given to the locals as soon as that is possible. Mechanisms for continuous funding need to be developed so projects do not come to an end once the PSO leaves. This issue goes to the need for coordination over time, as mentioned above.

One of the most persistent problems in PSOs is the need to renew mandates. In Liberia, UNOMIL's mandate had to be renewed or extended at least three times. In Haiti, the various UN missions there had to have there mandates renewed time and again over four years, each time for three to six month periods. Short mandates, due to resource shortfall etc, completely contradict the long-term peacebuilding nature of many PSOs. Whenever possible, Canada should insist that peace support operations be given a mandate whose length is commensurate with the

peacebuilding task. Things like de-mining, reintegration, institutional reform do not take place over night or even in a matter of weeks or months. A realistic mandate will provide both the mission participants and the recipients with the confidence that the task will be seen through to the end. Because funding of long-term mandates is often problematic, we need to be sure that all the agencies, departments and organizations who might be responsible for funding at different phases, are consulted at the planning stage so that an agreed framework for transition is developed at the outset of the mission. This will better help determine both the required length of the mandate and its realism and hopefully reconcile the tension between short-term mandates and long-term peacebuilding.

Challenge 4:Regional organizations will be a permanent and prominent feature of future PSOs and will take the lead in many circumstances. The challenge is to ensure that they are fit and equipped to perfom the task in accordance with UN principles.

In many ways this is a welcome development, but in practice the record is mixed.[42] Regional organizations usually lack both operational and financial resource and experience in conducting PSOs. The motives of some troop-participating countries in regional interventions are sometimes questionable. It also creates problems of coordination and authority if the UN comes to the operation late.

While Canada can do little to address the resource problems of regional organizations (we have our own), it can act on a number of fronts. First, Canada's Military and Assistance Training

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See: Herbert Howe, *supra* note 15; Carolyn M. Shaw, "Regional Peacekeeping: An Alternative to United Nations Operations?" *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 15 No.2 (Fall 1995), pp. 59-81; and Case Study: Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): UNOMIL/ECOMOG. New York: Lessons Learned Unit. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Lessons Learned from Cooperation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Peace Support. *Working Paper* No. 147 pp.

Program should emphasize peacekeeping and peacebuilding skills when training troops from regional organizations. Participation by those troops at the Pearson Peacekeeping College should be encouraged and subsidized. We should encourage the United Nations to share its vast experience in peace support operations and the lessons learned from those operations with regional organizations through whatever means feasible .We should also ensure that the UN arrangements with regional organizations in PSOs respect Charter provisions and are run under UN imprimatur. Canada should share its knowledge and experience through institutions like the Commonwealth, the Francophonie and the OAS.

Challenge 5: Neither financial nor human resources are infinite, though the number of possible peacebuilding tasks seems to be.

Canada should concentrate on some critical, (dare I say it) niche tasks for which it has expertise. Civilian police, as mentioned above, is one. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration is another. This is a critical aspect of any PSO and a determining factor in the long-term success of peacebuilding. Since Canada is making children and armed conflict a priority and child soldiers are an important aspect of that, focusing on DDR will double our investment. A focus on DDR also reemphasizes the importance of the continuous long-term view of peacebuilding during PSOs, since reintegration requires the participation of development agencies and banks. This focus will reinforce our emphasis on sustainability. In emphasizing this however, we need to pay due attention to civilians so that they do not perceive that the military, at whose hands they may have suffered, are disproportionately benefiting from their role.

Challenge 6: If Canada is to continue to be engaged in PSOs and wants to ensure their effectiveness, a premium should be placed on intellectual contemplation, study, and long-term thinking

Intellectually, Canada can take a number of initiatives. The first, and probably most important requirement, is for long-term and strategic thinking. Thinking about all the issues,

many of which have been raised in this paper. This needs to take place not just in the heat of a mission, but far in advance. The second is to regularly share information and knowledge among experts and practitioners, again in a dispassionate environment.

There are a number of ways that these processes can take place. Last year in Britain the British army participated in Rebuild 97, a simulation that explored the civilian-military perception of PSOs.[43]. Canada can engage in similar and regular scenario building or simulation exercises that reflect the realities of PSOs on the ground, at the UN, and in Ottawa. Participants in these simulations should include both civilian and military practitioners who engage in realistic and perhaps reverse role playing. These simulations can provide the players with an appreciation of each others perspectives and constraints as well as set the ground for better cooperation and coordination.

Canada could organize regular conferences, perhaps biannually, of players from the UN and in the field to discuss problems, approaches, solutions and best practices. These conferences could serve as reviews and progress reports. The opportunity (and excuse) for the first such conference will take place in November this year on the tenth anniversary of the election in Namibia. This anniversary conference could provide a retrospective of PSOs in the nineties since UNTAG, and include those individuals -- from the UN, the field, and Ottawa -- with experience in recent and past operations dating back to 1989. The conference should address a host of recent issues germane to the conduct of PSOs (e.g. UN reform, coordination problems, working with the World Bank), but would also look at the progress that has been made. At least a part of the conference should look at policy options for Canada. Funding could then be sought from the John Holmes Fund in addition to all relevant Canadian Departments and Agencies. Canada should also sponsor more frequent seminars on peacebuilding during PSOs, inviting specialists and experts to give talks and exchange viewpoints on different aspects and perspectives.

Anthony Verrier, "Rebuild97: a Simulated Exercise for Peace Support Operation." *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 5 No. 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 103-111.

Inter- and intra-departmentally there needs to be more frequent and regular sharing of information, views and problems. While most of the people interviewed in Ottawa are singing from the same songbook they tend to be carrying different tunes. In complex peace operations it is important to make sure that input from the different departments, divisions, and agencies is shared. Each is responsible for different aspects of the operation so their views will be critical to the success of the operation and long-term peacebuilding. It would also be worthwhile whenever possible to set up an interdepartmental task force or liaison teams whenever Canada is participating in a PSO. This should include the usual government suspects (DFAIT, DND, CIDA) and NGOs. This would begin to improve coordination in Canada.

The government should also consider establishing a small dedicated think tank to focus on the development security-nexus, particularly peacebuilding during PSOs. This organization could include, perhaps on a rotating basis, academics, experts, specialists, and practitioners with recent experience in the field, in government departments, in NGOS, and at the United Nations. While independent of government, it might develop a practical research program in consultation with the government. It could also provide issue specific policy analysis as required by the government. Canada would then have ready at hand a specific group of experts knowledgable and current on relevent on issues, themes, and regions relating to its peace and security responsibilities.

There are no quick fixes to coordination problems at the UN or in the field. But regular sharing of perspectives and information, along with considered study of the issues, can go along way toward building a shared understanding of issues and mutual cooperation to reach common goals. At the very least the government should sponsor more detailed and in depth studies of UN PSOs and all there aspects.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, this paper scratches only the surface of very complex issues. In peacebuilding terms we are confronting a good news bad news scenario. While in many respects we have

come a long way, in others there is a considerable road to travel. Thinking about PSOs as integrated undertakings has advanced enormously in the last few years, but our ability to implement that thinking still lags. Peace support operations suffer from seemingly time-honoured problems: poor coordination, a lack of resources, and political infighting at the UN. The tendency to rely on regional organizations with little or no experience in "democratic" peacekeeping could bring us back to square one in a lot of ways.

Still there have been significant successes, notably in UNTAG, ONUSAL, MINUGUA, and UNTAES to name a few. Much depends on the skill of the personnel involved and the commitment of local actors. Future success will depend on providing the requisite resources, a workable mandate, and committed cooperative personnel all sharing the same aim.

Canada needs to bring to the table realistic suggestions for improving the planning, deployment, and implementation of these complex operations. It also needs to provide resources, both intellectual and financial, to support our participation in such missions. It is one thing to wring your hands about what needs to be done and quite another to provide resources to help ensure it happens.

ANNEX I

Defining Peacebuilding

If PSOs are those operations attending the implementation of a peace agreement, what is peacebuilding? It is important to answer this question since we are alleging that PSOs engage in peacebuilding activities while there continues to be some disagreement about precisely what peacebuilding is. Still, this is not the place to try and settle the debate. A quick survey of many of the definitions that have been proffered should tell us whether civilian activities conducted during PSOs qualify as peacebuilding.

Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General described post-conflict peacebuilding recently as "action undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation."[44] More important, he noted that peacebuilding requires an integrated effort to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a conflict. Specifically, he noted that peacebuilding may involve the creation or strengthening of national institutions, monitoring elections, promoting human rights, providing for reintegration and rehabilitation programs, and creating conditions for resumed development.

Chetan Kumar elaborates on the Secretary-General's definition somewhat, pointing out that it is important to consider not simply the basket of activities that can be undertaken to build peace but whether a *self-sustaining process* can be initiated for the pre-emptive management of disputes.[45]

Most others who define peacebuilding approach it from a much broader perspective, allowing plenty of room for interpreting what is and isn't peacebuilding. Fen Hampson, notes that peacebuilding covers a wide range of activities and functions associated with political, social, and economic reconstruction in war-torn societies.[46] Hampson, as noted earlier, advises that such activities need to be linked to a negotiated peace settlement if they are to stand any chance of success in building peace.

Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy describes peacebuilding as "a package of

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The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Report of the Secretary General to the United Nations Security Council, April 1998, par 63 (www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/sgreport/report.htm

Chetan Kumar, "Building Peace in Haiti." New York: International Peace Academy, *Occasional Paper* (1998), p. 31.

See Hampson, *supra* note 2, p 702.

measures to strengthen and solidify peace by building a sustainable infrastructure of human security." He continues: "I see peacebuilding as casting a life line to foundering societies struggling to end the cycle of violence, restore civility and get back on their feet."[47]

Necla Tschirgi, reminds us that peacebuilding is an internationally-coined and promoted concept that "refers primarily to the international community's response to violent conflict, threats of violent conflict or the aftermath of such conflicts." "Peacebuilding, then," she writes, "is the point of intersection between local realities and international response, what one observer has called the meeting point of 'two anarchies'."[48] For the most part she relies on the definitions of peacebuilding provided in former UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, though she cites others who would expand the concept. One of these is Gareth Evans who defines peacebuilding as a set of strategies which aim to ensure that disputes, armed conflicts and other major crises do not arise in the first place -- and if they do arise that they do not subsequently recur.[49]

Clearly these perspectives, though slightly different one from the other, are hardly conflicting and in many senses are wholly compatible and even complementary. They also place the activities of most of today's PSOs squarely within the parameters of what is commonly understood as peacebuilding.

ANNEX II

Peacebuilding in Recent UN PSOs

Lloyd Axworthy, Speech....

Necla Tschirgi, *Defining Peace building*. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, unpublished paper (1997), p. 1.

See: Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*. Australia: Allen and Unwin (1993).

	MINURSO Western Sahara	UNOMIL Liberia	UNOMSIL Sierra Leone	UNTAES Croatia	MINURCA Central African Republic
Elections\ Referendums	X	X		X	X
Democratic Development		X	X	X	X
DDR		X	X	X	X
Resettlement\ Repatriation	X	X		X	
Civilian Police	X		X	X	X
Human Rights	-	X	X	X	X
Reconciliation			X	X	X
CBMs				X	X
Economic Reconstruction			X	X	X